Arms Sales in Financial Markets

47 Pages Posted: 30 Jun 2022 Last revised: 26 Nov 2024

See all articles by Vincent Glode

Vincent Glode

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School

Xingtan Zhang

Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business

Date Written: November 21, 2024

Abstract

Many financial transactions are of a fixed-sum nature, meaning that improvements in the terms of trade for one party often come at the expense of another party.  We model the feedback loop between the sales of trading advantages (e.g., data or co-location services) and traders' endogenous participation in financial markets.  A trader's benefit from purchasing trading advantages increases with aggregate market participation, but the benefit of participating decreases with other traders' purchases of trading advantages. In equilibrium, sellers of trading advantages (e.g., data providers or securities exchanges) may maximize their profits by prompting inefficiently low market participation and liquidity.

Keywords: JEL Codes: G20, G14, D82, D42

JEL Classification: G20, G14, D82, D42

Suggested Citation

Glode, Vincent and Zhang, Xingtan, Arms Sales in Financial Markets (November 21, 2024). Jacobs Levy Equity Management Center for Quantitative Financial Research Paper , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4146808 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4146808

Vincent Glode (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School ( email )

3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.vincentglode.com

Xingtan Zhang

Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business ( email )

1017, Oriental Plaza 1
No.1 Dong Chang'an Street
Beijing
China

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