Venture-Backed Ipos: Investment Duration and Lock-Up by Venture Capitalists

Posted: 2 Sep 2003

See all articles by Tereza Tykvova

Tereza Tykvova

University of Hohenheim - Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences

Abstract

We analyze the venture capitalist's decision on the timing of the IPO, the offer price and the fraction of shares he sells in the course of the IPO. Under certain assumptions about the parameters and the structure of the model, we obtain a single equilibrium in which high-quality firms separate from low-quality firms. The latter are liquidated after the first period, while the former go public either after having been financed by the venture capitalist for two periods or after one financing period using a lock-up.

Keywords: Venture Capital, IPO, Lock-up, Timing

JEL Classification: D80, G24, G32

Suggested Citation

Tykvova, Tereza, Venture-Backed Ipos: Investment Duration and Lock-Up by Venture Capitalists. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=414765

Tereza Tykvova (Contact Author)

University of Hohenheim - Faculty of Business, Economics and Social Sciences

Germany

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