Intent to Do Right? Interpretation of Lawfulness of Action in Crimes against Humanity

Abstract

Crimes against humanity are not organized crime writ large. Using examples of a Nazi official, a communist judge, and a Taliban executioner, this essay shows that such crimes entail a ‘pro’ attitude of perpetrators towards a parochial conception of law and right, and shared social reinterpretation of rightness and lawfulness of their acts. International criminal law dismisses relevance of such reinterpretation and focuses on shared intentions and joint plans of perpetrators. However, there are limits on in what sense an intention or plan may be shared, and disregard of these limits overstretches boundaries of individual liability and may put into question legitimacy of trials. This essay concludes with emphasizing the need for courts to instead engage in social reinterpretation of what is law.

Keywords: crimes against humanity, intent, individual liability