The Economics of WTO Rules on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures

37 Pages Posted: 16 Jun 2003

See all articles by Alan Sykes

Alan Sykes

Stanford University - Law School

Date Written: June 2003

Abstract

This paper evaluates the WTO rules relating to subsidies and countervailing measures from a welfare economics perspective. It concludes that the rules relating to "nonviolation" subsidies, export subsidies and certain agricultural subsidies have sound economic justification. The rules governing domestic subsidies generally, by contrast, do little to identify or police undesirable subsidies. Further, as has been argued elsewhere, countervailing measures are economically undesirable.

Keywords: international trade, GATT, SCM, GATS, world trade organization

Suggested Citation

Sykes, Alan, The Economics of WTO Rules on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (June 2003). U Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 186. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=415780 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.415780

Alan Sykes (Contact Author)

Stanford University - Law School ( email )

559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States

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