Weak Stability against Robust Deviations and the Bargaining Set in the Roommate Problem

17 Pages Posted: 1 Aug 2022 Last revised: 28 Nov 2022

See all articles by Daisuke Hirata

Daisuke Hirata

Hitotsubashi University

Yusuke Kasuya

Kobe University - Faculty of Economics

Kentaro Tomoeda

University of Technology Sydney (UTS) - Department of Economics

Date Written: November 10, 2022

Abstract

We propose a new solution concept in the roommate problem, weak stability against robust deviations (wSaRD), by weakening a similar concept of Hirata et al. (2021). We identify a common sufficient condition for wSaRD and weak stability of Klijn and Massó (2003). We can always construct a weakly efficient matching satisfying this condition. Consequently, we can always find a wSaRD matching within the bargaining set. This is in contrast with the original, stronger concept of Hirata et al. (2021), which does not always intersect with the bargaining set.

Suggested Citation

Hirata, Daisuke and Kasuya, Yusuke and Tomoeda, Kentaro, Weak Stability against Robust Deviations and the Bargaining Set in the Roommate Problem (November 10, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4159015 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4159015

Daisuke Hirata

Hitotsubashi University ( email )

2-1 Naka Kunitachi-shi
Tokyo 186-8601
Japan

Yusuke Kasuya

Kobe University - Faculty of Economics ( email )

2-1, Rokkodai
Nada-Ku
Kobe, Hyogo, 657-8501
Japan

Kentaro Tomoeda (Contact Author)

University of Technology Sydney (UTS) - Department of Economics ( email )

Sydney
Australia

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/kentarotomoeda/

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