The Impact of Money in Politics on Labor and Capital: Evidence from Citizens United v. FEC

80 Pages Posted: 20 Jul 2022 Last revised: 29 Dec 2023

See all articles by Pat Akey

Pat Akey

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Tania Babina

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Greg Buchak

Stanford University Graduate School of Business

Ana-Maria Tenekedjieva

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 16, 2022

Abstract

We examine whether corporate money in politics benefits or hurts labor using the 2010 Supreme Court ruling Citizens United, which rendered bans on political election spending unconstitutional. In difference-in-difference analyses, affected states experience increases in both capital and labor income relative to unaffected states. We find evidence consistent with increased political spending spurring political competition and the adoption of pro-growth policies. These policies benefit a broader set of constituents as we find a broad-based increase in labor income. Affected states see increased political turnover and reduced regulatory burdens. The economic effects are stronger among ex-ante politically inactive and younger firms.

Keywords: Labor and finance, Citizens United, money in politics, political spending, labor income, wages, earnings, capital income, profits, political power

JEL Classification: D33, D72, E25, G03, G38, J30, P16

Suggested Citation

Akey, Pat and Babina, Tania and Buchak, Greg and Tenekedjieva, Ana-Maria, The Impact of Money in Politics on Labor and Capital: Evidence from Citizens United v. FEC (September 16, 2022). Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper , Rotman School of Management Working Paper No. 4159475, European Corporate Governance Institute – Finance Working Paper No. 946/2023, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4159475 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4159475

Pat Akey (Contact Author)

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management ( email )

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European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

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Tania Babina

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://taniababina.com

Greg Buchak

Stanford University Graduate School of Business ( email )

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6507214004 (Phone)
94305 (Fax)

Ana-Maria Tenekedjieva

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ( email )

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Washington, DC 20551
United States

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