Conflict in the Pool: A Field Experiment

26 Pages Posted: 13 Jul 2022

See all articles by Marco Faravelli

Marco Faravelli

The University of Queensland

Loukas Balafoutas

University of Innsbruck

Roman M. Sheremeta

Case Western Reserve University

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Abstract

We conduct a field experiment on conflict in swimming pools. When all lanes are occupied, an actor joins the least crowded lane and asks one of the swimmers to move to another lane. The lane represents a contested scarce resource. We vary the actor’s valuation (high and low) for the good through the message they deliver. Also, we take advantage of the natural variation in the number of swimmers to proxy for their valuation. Consistent with theoretical predictions, a swimmer’s propensity to engage in conflict increases in scarcity (incentive effect) and decreases in the actor’s valuation (discouragement effect). We complement the results with survey evidence.

Keywords: conflict, valuations, scarcity, field experiment.

Suggested Citation

Faravelli, Marco and Balafoutas, Loukas and Sheremeta, Roman M., Conflict in the Pool: A Field Experiment. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4161583 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4161583

Marco Faravelli (Contact Author)

The University of Queensland ( email )

Australia

Loukas Balafoutas

University of Innsbruck ( email )

Universitätsstraße 15
Innsbruck, Innsbruck 6020
Austria

Roman M. Sheremeta

Case Western Reserve University ( email )

10900 Euclid Ave.
Cleveland, OH 44106
United States

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