On the Influence of Extreme Parties in Electoral Competition with Policy-Motivated Candidates

26 Pages Posted: 17 Jun 2003

See all articles by Georges Casamatta

Georges Casamatta

Toulouse School of Economics (GREMAQ-CNRS); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Philippe De Donder

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Date Written: May 2003

Abstract

We study and compare equilibrium platforms in models of one-dimensional electoral competition with two and four policy-motivated parties. We first analyse the plurality game, where the party that gets the most votes is elected and implements its proposed platform. Restrictions on the set of credible announcements are needed to get existence of equilibria. Comparing equilibria with two and four parties, we obtain that moderate parties react to the introduction of extreme parties by proposing the same or more extreme equilibrium platforms. We then study the proportional system, where the policy implemented is a weighted sum of the proposals, with the voting shares as weights. Here, the existence of extreme parties leads moderate ones to choose more centrist platforms.

Keywords: Electoral competition, plurality rule, proportional system

JEL Classification: D72

Suggested Citation

Casamatta, Georges and De Donder, Philippe, On the Influence of Extreme Parties in Electoral Competition with Policy-Motivated Candidates (May 2003). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=416240

Georges Casamatta (Contact Author)

Toulouse School of Economics (GREMAQ-CNRS) ( email )

Manufacture des Tabacs (bât. F)
21 Allee de Brienne
31000 Toulouse
France

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Philippe De Donder

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) ( email )

Place Anatole-France
Toulouse Cedex, F-31042
France

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