Citizen Candidacy with Asymmetric Information

39 Pages Posted: 19 Jun 2003

See all articles by Georges Casamatta

Georges Casamatta

Toulouse School of Economics (GREMAQ-CNRS); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Wilfried Zantman

University of Toulouse 1 - Groupe de Recherche en Economie Mathématique et Quantitative (GREMAQ)

Date Written: May 2003

Abstract

We extend a simple version of the citizen candidates model (developed by Osborne-Slivinsky (1996) and Besley-Coate (1997)) to an asymmetric information setting, in which the type of a given individual is assumed to be private information. Focusing on a particular class of perfect Bayesian equilibria, we show that there exist two kinds of equilibria. In the first one, both non-median types become candidates and those equilibria generalize to any number of (potential) candidates. In the second one, only one of the non-median types chooses to become candidates for the election and those equilibria hold for a number of (potential) candidates at most equal to three. This is in sharp contrast with the complete information framework in which only the median type individuals stand for office when the entry cost is sufficiently low.

Keywords: Political economy, information, political competition

JEL Classification: D72, D82

Suggested Citation

Casamatta, Georges and Zantman, Wilfried, Citizen Candidacy with Asymmetric Information (May 2003). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3886. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=416241

Georges Casamatta (Contact Author)

Toulouse School of Economics (GREMAQ-CNRS) ( email )

Manufacture des Tabacs (bât. F)
21 Allee de Brienne
31000 Toulouse
France

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Wilfried Zantman

University of Toulouse 1 - Groupe de Recherche en Economie Mathématique et Quantitative (GREMAQ) ( email )

Manufacture des Tabacs
21 Allees de Brienne
Toulouse, 31000
France
+33 5 61 12 85 52 (Phone)
+33 5 61 22 55 63 (Fax)

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