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https://ssrn.com/abstract=416268
 
 

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Judicial Checks and Balances


Rafael La Porta


Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Florencio Lopez de Silanes


SKEMA Business School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Cristian Pop-Eleches


Columbia University - School of International & Public Affairs (SIPA)

Andrei Shleifer


Harvard University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

June 2003

NBER Working Paper No. w9775

Abstract:     
In the Anglo-American constitutional tradition, judicial checks and balances are often seen as crucial guarantees of freedom. Hayek (1960) distinguishes two ways in which the judiciary provides such checks and balances: judicial independence and constitutional review. We create a new data base of constitutional rules in 71 countries that reflect these provisions. We find strong support for the proposition that both judicial independence and constitutional review are associated with greater freedom. Consistent with theory, judicial independence accounts for some of the positive effect of common law legal origin on measures of economic freedom. The results point to significant benefits of the Anglo-American system of government for freedom.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 36


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Date posted: June 15, 2003  

Suggested Citation

La Porta, Rafael and Lopez de Silanes, Florencio and Pop-Eleches, Cristian and Shleifer, Andrei, Judicial Checks and Balances (June 2003). NBER Working Paper No. w9775. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=416268

Contact Information

Rafael La Porta (Contact Author)
Dartmouth College - Tuck School of Business ( email )
Hanover, NH 03755
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Florencio Lopez de Silanes
SKEMA Business School ( email )
Campus de Lille
Avenue Willy Brandt, Euralille
Lille, 59777
France
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Cristian (Kiki) Pop-Eleches
Columbia University - School of International & Public Affairs (SIPA) ( email )
420 West 118th Street
New York, NY 10027
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.columbia.edu/~cp2124
Andrei Shleifer
Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )
Littauer Center
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-5046 (Phone)
617-496-1708 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.economics.harvard.edu/~ashleife/
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Feedback to SSRN


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