The Party System in the European Parliament: Collusive or Competitive?

23 Pages Posted: 13 Sep 2003

See all articles by Simon Hix

Simon Hix

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Government

Amie Kreppel

Department of Political Science, University of Florida

Abdul Noury

Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES)

Abstract

This article looks at the development of the two main features of the party system in the European Parliament (EP): the organization of the party groups, and the nature of competition between these groups. On the organizational side, we examine the foundation of the party groups in the Common Assembly and the evolution of party organization from the appointed to the elected Parliament. On the competition side, we focus on the main axis of competition: the relationship between the Party of European Socialists (PES) and the European People's Party (EPP). We develop a set of competition propositions about PES-EPP collusion, and test these arguments in a statistical analysis of PES and EPP roll-call voting since 1979. We conclude that, contrary to what might be expected, the party system in the EP has become more consolidated and more competitive as the powers of the EP have increased.

Suggested Citation

Hix, Simon and Kreppel, Amie and Noury, Abdul, The Party System in the European Parliament: Collusive or Competitive?. Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 41, pp. 309-331, April 2003. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=416644

Simon Hix (Contact Author)

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Government ( email )

Northampton NN7 1NE
United Kingdom

Amie Kreppel

Department of Political Science, University of Florida ( email )

PO Box 117325
234 Anderson Hall
Gainesville, FL 32611-7325
United States
352-392-0262 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.polisci.ufl.edu

Abdul Noury

Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES) ( email )

Ave. Franklin D Roosevelt, 50 - C.P. 114
Brussels, B-1050
Belgium
+32 2 650 4133 (Phone)
+32 2 650 3825 (Fax)

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