Public Tax Disclosures and Fair Share Perceptions

61 Pages Posted: 27 Jul 2022 Last revised: 16 May 2024

See all articles by Bart Dierynck

Bart Dierynck

Tilburg University

Martin Jacob

University of Navarra, IESE Business School

Maximilian A. Müller

University of Cologne

Christian Peters

Nanyang Technological University

Victor van Pelt

WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management

Date Written: May 16, 2024

Abstract

Regulators increasingly consider and mandate public tax disclosures. Public tax disclosures are often assumed to raise awareness and scrutiny of firms' tax positions and would thus help retail investors determine whether a firm is paying its fair share of taxes. We conduct three experiments to test this assumption. The first experiment shows that retail investors become worse at developing informed perceptions about firms' tax strategies, leading to less differentiated fair share perceptions in the presence of public tax disclosures. The reason is that retail investors adopt a heuristic approach focusing on the easy-to-process publicly disclosed tax information. We find that this also has implications for retail investors' willingness to invest. The second and third experiments use theory-driven interventions to attenuate the adverse effects of public tax disclosures. Our results show that these theory-driven interventions can indeed reduce the adverse effects of public tax disclosures.

Keywords: Public tax disclosure, corporate taxation, tax transparency

JEL Classification: C91, H26, M48

Suggested Citation

Dierynck, Bart and Jacob, Martin and Müller, Maximilian A. and Peters, Christian P. H. and van Pelt, Victor, Public Tax Disclosures and Fair Share Perceptions (May 16, 2024). TRR 266 Accounting for Transparency Working Paper Series No. 94, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4173175 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4173175

Bart Dierynck (Contact Author)

Tilburg University ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, DC Noord-Brabant 5000 LE
Netherlands

Martin Jacob

University of Navarra, IESE Business School ( email )

Avenida Pearson 21
Barcelona, 08034
Spain

Maximilian A. Müller

University of Cologne ( email )

Albertus-Magnus-Platz
Cologne, 50923
Germany

Christian P. H. Peters

Nanyang Technological University ( email )

Nanyang Business School
91 Nanyang Avenue #05-094
Singapore, 639956
Singapore
+65 6790 4656 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://dr.ntu.edu.sg/cris/rp/rp02266

Victor Van Pelt

WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management ( email )

Burgplatz 2
Vallendar, 56179
Germany

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