Correlated Equilibria and Forecasts based on Naïve Play in Hawk-Dove Games

55 Pages Posted: 3 Aug 2022 Last revised: 21 Oct 2024

See all articles by Timothy N. Cason

Timothy N. Cason

Purdue University - Krannert School of Management

Tridib Sharma

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) - Centro de Investigacion Economica

Radovan Vadovic

Carleton University

Date Written: June 08, 2024

Abstract

In most games, for equilibrium to result, players need to forecast the equilibrium and choose consistent strategies. We elicit forecasts of outcomes in a series of Hawk-Dove (aka chicken) games played by other subjects (players). We ask whether these forecasts are consistent with any correlated equilibrium of a class of the games that allow for the possibility of types with pro-social preferences. Surprisingly, even though players are anonymous and randomly matched, forecasters believe that the players’ actions are correlated. However, forecasts are not consistent with any correlated equilibrium. Beliefs in non-random (assortative) matching are consistent with the correlated forecasts.

Keywords: correlated equilibrium, correlated beliefs, assortative matching, laboratory experiment, social preferences

JEL Classification: C72, C91, D84, D8

Suggested Citation

Cason, Timothy N. and Sharma, Tridib and Vadovic, Radovan, Correlated Equilibria and Forecasts based on Naïve Play in Hawk-Dove Games (June 08, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4174461 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4174461

Timothy N. Cason

Purdue University - Krannert School of Management ( email )

1310 Krannert Building
West Lafayette, IN 47907-1310
United States
765-494-1737 (Phone)

Tridib Sharma

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) - Centro de Investigacion Economica ( email )

Av. Camino a Santa Teresa #930
Col. Heroes de Padierna
Mexico City, D.F. 10370
Mexico D.F.
+525 6284197 (Phone)
+525 6284058 (Fax)

Radovan Vadovic (Contact Author)

Carleton University ( email )

1125 Colonel By Drive
Ottawa, Ontario K1S 5B6
Canada

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