Correlated Equilibria and Forecasts based on Naïve Play in Hawk-Dove Games
55 Pages Posted: 3 Aug 2022 Last revised: 21 Oct 2024
Date Written: June 08, 2024
Abstract
In most games, for equilibrium to result, players need to forecast the equilibrium and choose consistent strategies. We elicit forecasts of outcomes in a series of Hawk-Dove (aka chicken) games played by other subjects (players). We ask whether these forecasts are consistent with any correlated equilibrium of a class of the games that allow for the possibility of types with pro-social preferences. Surprisingly, even though players are anonymous and randomly matched, forecasters believe that the players’ actions are correlated. However, forecasts are not consistent with any correlated equilibrium. Beliefs in non-random (assortative) matching are consistent with the correlated forecasts.
Keywords: correlated equilibrium, correlated beliefs, assortative matching, laboratory experiment, social preferences
JEL Classification: C72, C91, D84, D8
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Cason, Timothy N. and Sharma, Tridib and Vadovic, Radovan, Correlated Equilibria and Forecasts based on Naïve Play in Hawk-Dove Games (June 08, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4174461 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4174461
Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?
Feedback
Feedback to SSRN