Are Firms Gerrymandered?

63 Pages Posted: 28 Jul 2022

See all articles by Joaquin Artes

Joaquin Artes

Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM)

Aaron Russell Kaufman

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Brian Kelleher Richter

Jeffrey F. Timmons

NYU Abu Dhabi

Date Written: June 21, 2022

Abstract

We provide the first evidence that firms, not just voters, are gerrymandered. We compare allocations of firms in enacted redistricting plans to counterfactual distributions constructed using simulation methods. We find that firms are over-allocated to districts held by the mapmakers’ party when partisans control the redistricting process. Firms are more proportionately allocated by redistricting commissions. Our results hold when we account for the gerrymandering of seats: holding fixed the number of seats the mapmakers’ party wins, firms tend to obtain more firms than expected. Our research reveals that partisan mapmakers target more than just voters.

Suggested Citation

Artes, Joaquin and Kaufman, Aaron Russell and Richter, Brian Kelleher and Timmons, Jeffrey F., Are Firms Gerrymandered? (June 21, 2022). George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy & the State Working Paper No. 320, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4174486 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4174486

Joaquin Artes (Contact Author)

Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM) ( email )

Carretera de Humera s/n
Madrid, Madrid 28223
Spain

Aaron Russell Kaufman

affiliation not provided to SSRN

No Address Available

Jeffrey F. Timmons

NYU Abu Dhabi ( email )

PO Box 129188
Abu Dhabi
United Arab Emirates
(971) 262 84523 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://https://nyuad.nyu.edu/en/academics/faculty/jeffrey-timmons.html

No contact information is available for Brian Kelleher Richter

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