Information Manipulation and Repression: A Theory and Evidence from the COVID Response in Russia

70 Pages Posted: 29 Jul 2022 Last revised: 3 Apr 2024

See all articles by Natalia Lamberova

Natalia Lamberova

University of Texas at Dallas

Konstantin Sonin

University of Chicago - Harris School of Public Policy

Date Written: November 20, 2023

Abstract

Were COVID-19 and the associated restrictions used by authoritarian governments to tighten their grip on power? Using data from 83 Russian regions, we show that information manipulation and political repression were influenced by the strength of the local civil society and institutions. Repression comple-mented propaganda: more politically motivated arrests were associated with an increase in information manipulation. Repression waves that followed the poisoning of Alexey Navalny, the opposition leader, in August 2020 and his arrest in January 2021 were more pronounced in those regions that manipulated COVID-19 statistics more. The increase of authoritarian control came at a price: misinformation reduced compliance with the pandemic restrictions. In addition to two-way fixed effects and IV, we use sensitivity analysis to account for possible omitted variables. Our findings confirm, both theoretically and empirically, the complementarity between propaganda and repression as instruments of authoritarian control.

Keywords: authoritarian politics, information manipulation, repression, civil society

JEL Classification: P16, D7, P4

Suggested Citation

Lamberova, Natalia and Sonin, Konstantin, Information Manipulation and Repression: A Theory and Evidence from the COVID Response in Russia (November 20, 2023). University of Chicago, Becker Friedman Institute for Economics Working Paper No. 2022-101, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4174501 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4174501

Natalia Lamberova

University of Texas at Dallas ( email )

Richardson, TX 75080
United States

Konstantin Sonin (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Harris School of Public Policy ( email )

1155 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

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