The Distributional Impact of the Minimum Wage in the Short and Long Run

68 Pages Posted: 1 Aug 2022 Last revised: 11 Apr 2025

See all articles by Erik Hurst

Erik Hurst

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Patrick Kehoe

Stanford University

Elena Pastorino

Stanford University - Department of Economics

Thomas Winberry

University of Pennsylvania

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 2022

Abstract

We develop a framework with rich worker heterogeneity, firm monopsony power, and putty-clay technology to study the distributional impact of the minimum wage in the short and long run. Our production technology is disciplined to be consistent with the small estimated employment effects of the minimum wage in the short run and the large estimated elasticities of substitution across inputs in the long run. We find that in the short run, a large increase in the minimum wage has a small effect on employment and therefore increases the labor income of the workers who were earning less than the new minimum wage. In the long run, however, the minimum wage has perverse distributional implications in that it reduces the employment, income, and welfare of precisely the low-income workers it is meant to help. Nonetheless, these long-run effects take time to fully materialize because firms slowly adjust their mix of inputs. Existing transfer programs, such as the earned income tax credit (EITC), are more effective at improving long-run outcomes for workers at the low end of the wage distribution. But combining existing programs with a modest increase in the minimum wage generates even larger welfare gains for low-earning workers.

Suggested Citation

Hurst, Erik and Kehoe, Patrick and Pastorino, Elena and Winberry, Thomas, The Distributional Impact of the Minimum Wage in the Short and Long Run (July 2022). NBER Working Paper No. w30294, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4177541

Erik Hurst (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Patrick Kehoe

Stanford University ( email )

Elena Pastorino

Stanford University - Department of Economics ( email )

Landau Economics Building
579 Serra Mall
STANFORD, CA 94305-6072
United States

Thomas Winberry

University of Pennsylvania ( email )

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
25
Abstract Views
409
PlumX Metrics