The Nature, Detection, and Avoidance of Harmful Discrimination in Criminal Justice

53 Pages Posted: 5 Aug 2022 Last revised: 4 May 2023

See all articles by Brendan O'Flaherty

Brendan O'Flaherty

Columbia University, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics

Rajiv Sethi

Barnard College, Columbia University; Santa Fe Institute

Morgan Williams Jr

Barnard College, Columbia University, Department of Economics

Date Written: August 1, 2022

Abstract

We provide a selective survey of the literature on discrimination by criminal justice agents, and argue for a taxonomy of harms that differs from conventional approaches. Discrimination can be self-defeating if it reduces welfare among targets of discrimination while serving no legitimate purpose for the discriminating party. Even if a legitimate purpose is served, discrimination can be deliberative or demeaning, resulting in welfare losses that need to be accounted for. Deliberative and demeaning discrimination can also be self-defeating, through general equilibrium effects on witness cooperation, clearance rates, and preemptive and retaliatory violence. We consider how harmful discrimination can be detected and avoided, as well as changes in our understanding of discrimination resulting from the proliferation of predictive algorithms.

Keywords: Discrimination, Policing, Criminal Justice, Algorithms

JEL Classification: J15, J18, K40

Suggested Citation

O'Flaherty, Brendan and Sethi, Rajiv and Williams Jr, Morgan, The Nature, Detection, and Avoidance of Harmful Discrimination in Criminal Justice (August 1, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4178428 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4178428

Brendan O'Flaherty (Contact Author)

Columbia University, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics ( email )

420 W. 118th Street
Mail Code 3308
New York, NY 10027
United States

Rajiv Sethi

Barnard College, Columbia University ( email )

3009 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States
212-854-5140 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.columbia.edu/~rs328/

Santa Fe Institute

1399 Hyde Park Road
Santa Fe, NM 87501
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Morgan Williams Jr

Barnard College, Columbia University, Department of Economics ( email )

3009 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States
2128543790 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.morganwilliamsjr.com

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