Making Sense of Evil Law

Abstract

In this paper I introduce, define, and ultimately defend the term ‘evil law’. Firstly, I argue that ‘evil law’ is distinct from merely ‘bad’ or ‘unjust’ law and can be defined as law, which, if interpreted according to its best purpose, will enable intolerable harm (including atrocities) to the victims themselves. Secondly, I claim that ‘evil law’ is law despite objections from both its ‘external’ (Radbruch and Finnis) and ‘internal’ (Fuller) immorality. Instead of eschewing legality, evil regimes benefit from it in a number of ways. Finally, I answer Cole’s challenge that using the vocabulary of ‘evil law’ is at best reductive and at worst dangerous. Correctly defined, ‘evil law’ does not hinder but instead aids us in asking further questions such as why it is created and sustained. Even more so, proper use of the vocabulary of ‘evil’ helps articulate the horror evil law inflicts on those marginalized and corrupted by it.

Keywords: evil, law and morality, legal history