The Political Economy of Controls: Complexity

37 Pages Posted: 16 Jul 2004

See all articles by Anne O. Krueger

Anne O. Krueger

International Monetary Fund (IMF); Stanford University - Graduate School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Roderick Duncan

Charles Sturt University - School of Marketing and Management (Bathurst campus)

Date Written: April 1993

Abstract

Increasing complexity of regulation over time is a regular empirical phenomenon whenever political processes attempt to control economic activity. In this paper it is argued that a tendency toward increasing complexity of controls is probably inherent in most efforts to regulate, and that the great likelihood that it will occur should be taken into account in initial policy formulation. Economic policy analyses may be correct as formulated on the assumption that the initial policies will be adopted and not be altered, but be wrong if it is recognized that increased complexity may be an inevitable cost of the policy.

Suggested Citation

Krueger, Anne O. and Duncan, Roderick, The Political Economy of Controls: Complexity (April 1993). NBER Working Paper No. w4351, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=418282

Anne O. Krueger (Contact Author)

International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )

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Stanford University - Graduate School of Business ( email )

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Roderick Duncan

Charles Sturt University - School of Marketing and Management (Bathurst campus) ( email )

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Australia

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