Finance, Informal Competition, and Expectations: A Firm-Level Analysis

43 Pages Posted: 9 Aug 2022

See all articles by Emanuele Brancati

Emanuele Brancati

Sapienza University of Rome; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; Sapienza University of Rome - Faculty of Economics

Michele Di Maio

Sapienza University of Rome

Aminur Rahman

World Bank

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Abstract

This paper documents the link between finance and informal competition. Using longitudinal firm-level data, we show that formal firms that are more exposed to the competition of informal firms are less likely to apply for a bank loan. This result is not due to sample selection, omitted variable bias, or reverse causality, and it is robust to different econometric specifications, including the use of an IV strategy. As for the mechanism explaining our result, we show that firms more exposed to informal competition have worse expectations on future sales growth, which in turn are associated with a lower probability of loan application. Finally, we provide suggestive evidence excluding supply-side mechanisms that may explain heterogeneities in firms’ access to finance.

Keywords: Finance, informality, competition, Expectations, MENA countries

Suggested Citation

Brancati, Emanuele and Di Maio, Michele and Rahman, Aminur, Finance, Informal Competition, and Expectations: A Firm-Level Analysis. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4185535 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4185535

Emanuele Brancati

Sapienza University of Rome ( email )

via Castro del Laurenziano 9
Roma, IA Rome 00191
Italy

IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Sapienza University of Rome - Faculty of Economics ( email )

Via del Castro Laurenziano 9
Rome, 00161
Italy

Michele Di Maio (Contact Author)

Sapienza University of Rome ( email )

via del Castro Laurenziano 9
Rome
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/a/uniroma1.it/micheledimaio/home

Aminur Rahman

World Bank ( email )

1818 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20433
United States

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