An Anatomy of Crypto-Enabled Cybercrimes

22 Pages Posted: 18 Aug 2022 Last revised: 25 May 2023

See all articles by Lin William Cong

Lin William Cong

Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management; Cornell SC Johnson College of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Campbell R. Harvey

Duke University - Fuqua School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Daniel Rabetti

National University of Singapore (NUS)

Zong-Yu Wu

Fox It

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 20, 2024

Abstract

The advent of cryptocurrencies and digital assets holds the promise of improving financial systems by offering cheap, quick, and secure transfer of value. However, it also opens up new payment channels for cybercrimes. Assembling a diverse set of public on-chain and off-chain, proprietary and hand-collected data, including attacker-victim negotiations and dark web conversations in Russian, we present an initial anatomy of crypto-enabled cybercrimes, highlighting relevant economic issues and proposing areas for future research. Among others, we find ransomware, as the most dominant organized crypto-enabled cybercrime, entails criminal gangs that operate like firms who adopt modern revenue models and carefully manage their reputations. We suggest that blanket restrictions on cryptocurrency usage may prove counterproductive. Instead, blockchain transparency enables effective forensics for tracking, monitoring, and shutting down dominant cybercriminal organizations, which potentially facilitates a more secure and reliable crypto ecosystem in the longer term.

Keywords: JEL Classification: G15, G18, G20, K29, K42, O16 blockchain forensics, cybersecurity, ransomware, security breach disclosure

JEL Classification: F24, F52, G15, G18, G23, G38, K42

Suggested Citation

Cong, Lin and Harvey, Campbell R. and Rabetti, Daniel and Wu, Zong-Yu, An Anatomy of Crypto-Enabled Cybercrimes (June 20, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4188661 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4188661

Lin Cong

Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management ( email )

Ithaca, NY 14853
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.linwilliamcong.com/

Cornell SC Johnson College of Business ( email )

Ithaca, NY 14850
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Campbell R. Harvey

Duke University - Fuqua School of Business ( email )

Box 90120
Durham, NC 27708-0120
United States
919-660-7768 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.duke.edu/~charvey

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Daniel Rabetti (Contact Author)

National University of Singapore (NUS) ( email )

1E Kent Ridge Road
NUHS Tower Block Level 7
Singapore, 119228
Singapore

Zong-Yu Wu

Fox It ( email )

NY

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