Partisanship, Government Responsibility, and Charitable Donations

41 Pages Posted: 13 Aug 2022 Last revised: 25 Sep 2022

See all articles by Bouke Klein Teeselink

Bouke Klein Teeselink

King's College London; Yale School of Management

Georgios Melios

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Psychological and Behavioural Science; University College London

Abstract

A large literature in public economics seeks to answer whether government activity crowds out charitable donations, but the empirical evidence is mixed. To resolve this inconsistency, we consider that people base their donation decisions not only on government spending per se, but also on their support of the government. Using US tax return data, we find that support for the incumbent president crowds out charitable donations. The reduction in donations cannot be explained by changes in government spending, beliefs about government spending, government grants to Republican or Democrat-leaning charities, or fundraising activity. Instead, it is consistent with the notion that partisans attribute greater problem-solving responsibilities to own-party governments.

Keywords: Crowding out, Charities, Donations, Partisanship, Beliefs

Suggested Citation

Klein Teeselink, Bouke and Melios, Georgios, Partisanship, Government Responsibility, and Charitable Donations. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4189400 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4189400

Bouke Klein Teeselink

King's College London ( email )

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London
United Kingdom

Yale School of Management ( email )

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New Haven, CT 06511

Georgios Melios (Contact Author)

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Psychological and Behavioural Science ( email )

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55/56 Lincoln's Inn
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University College London ( email )

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