Love the Job... Or the Patient?  Task vs. Mission-Based Motivations in Health Care

28 Pages Posted: 16 Aug 2022

See all articles by Sheheryar Banuri

Sheheryar Banuri

University of East Anglia (UEA) - School of Economic and Social Studies; University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS)

Philip Keefer

Inter-American Development Bank

Damien de Walque

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG); World Bank

Abstract

A large literature demonstrates that mission-based motives are a central feature of mission-oriented labor markets but leaves open the question of how mission motivation interacts with another, pervasive source of intrinsic motivation, task-based motivation.  We find that in the presence of significant task motivation, mission motivation has no additional effect on effort.  The evidence emerges from experiments with nearly 250 medical and nursing students in Burkina Faso.  The students exert effort in three tasks, from boring to interesting.  In addition, half of the students are assigned to a task where mission motivation is present:  their effort on the task generates a public good (benefits for a charity).  Two strong results emerge.  First, task motivation has an economically important effect on effort.  Second, mission motivation increases effort (in line with previous findings) for mundane tasks, but not when the task is interesting.

Keywords: public sector reform, civil service, intrinsic motivation, extrinsic motivation, performance

Suggested Citation

Banuri, Sheheryar and Keefer, Philip and de Walque, Damien, Love the Job... Or the Patient?  Task vs. Mission-Based Motivations in Health Care. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4191433 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4191433

Sheheryar Banuri (Contact Author)

University of East Anglia (UEA) - School of Economic and Social Studies ( email )

Norwich, Norfolk NR4 7TJ
United Kingdom
+441603591246 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.uea.ac.uk/economics/people/profile/s-banuri

University of East Anglia (UEA) - Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) ( email )

United Kingdom
+441603591246 (Phone)

Philip Keefer

Inter-American Development Bank ( email )

1300 New York Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20577
United States
202-623-1961 (Phone)

Damien De Walque

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

1818 H. Street, N.W.
MSN3-311
Washington, DC 20433
United States

World Bank ( email )

1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20433
United States

HOME PAGE: http://econ.worldbank.org/staff/ddewalque

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