The Case for Convergence between American and European Regulation of Big Tech

19 Pages Posted: 26 Aug 2022

See all articles by Michal Halperin

Michal Halperin

Harvard Kennedy School

Ketan Ahuja

University of Oxford; Harvard Kennedy School

Date Written: August 18, 2022

Abstract

The US and the EU differ in their antitrust and competition regimes. However, the challenges brought by big-tech’s growing market power create a unique opportunity to converge competition policy in Europe and the US on technology platforms. Big-tech is global: it raises similar dilemmas and similar challenges globally. It is therefore the industry where convergence in antitrust and competition is most feasible and desirable.

The timing is perfect. Attitudes in the United States towards big-tech have shifted among enforcers, legislatures, academia and the public. In Europe, the growing frustration around challenging big-tech with traditional competition enforcement tools has increased the appetite for new approaches.

We suggest a few immediate steps that can be taken to promote convergence, both in content of the law and in enforcement efforts, without the need for bilateral or multilateral agreements or legislation:
• Create joint policy and principles for merger analysis for the technology industry.
• Challenge practices or transactions in a joint and coordinated manner.
• To facilitate the above – allow agencies to share evidence freely.
• Create the infrastructure for exchanging high ranked executives between competition agencies.
• Create suggested templates for regulation of different practices that require ex-ante treatment.

Our paper is based on a series of interviews with antitrust and competition enforcers, regulators and representatives from big-tech companies.

Keywords: Antitrust, Competition Policy, International Enforcement, Convergence

Suggested Citation

Halperin, Michal and Ahuja, Ketan, The Case for Convergence between American and European Regulation of Big Tech (August 18, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4194085 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4194085

Michal Halperin

Harvard Kennedy School ( email )

John F. Kennedy School of Government
79 JFK Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
8574234030 (Phone)
02446 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.hks.harvard.edu/centers/mrcbg/about/senior-fellows#halperin

Ketan Ahuja (Contact Author)

University of Oxford

Oxford
United Kingdom

Harvard Kennedy School

79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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