Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Global Warming

91 Pages Posted: 26 Aug 2022 Last revised: 30 Nov 2023

See all articles by Alexander F. Gazmararian

Alexander F. Gazmararian

Princeton University

Helen V. Milner

Princeton University - Princeton School of Public and International Affairs; Princeton University - Department of Political Science

Date Written: August 19, 2022

Abstract

Why do some countries pass laws to reduce emissions that cause climate change while others do not? We theorize that climate change-related disasters cause leaders to view global warming as more proximate, but whether they have incentives to enact mitigation laws depends on their country's geographic vulnerability to future damages. We use a spatial integrated assessment model to measure global warming's local economic effects, which allows us to predict how leaders respond to disasters based on their vulnerability. An analysis of mitigation laws from 1990-2020 in 155 countries shows that only governments in locations facing the greatest future climate damage react to disasters by passing mitigation policies. Distinct from the historical North-South divide, our findings highlight a growing geographic cleavage in national responses to climate change.

Keywords: Climate Change, International Political Economy, Open Economy Politics, political science

JEL Classification: F64, F68, Q54, Q58

Suggested Citation

Gazmararian, Alexander F. and Milner, Helen V., Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Global Warming (August 19, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4194232 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4194232

Alexander F. Gazmararian (Contact Author)

Princeton University ( email )

United States

Helen V. Milner

Princeton University - Princeton School of Public and International Affairs ( email )

Princeton University
Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
United States

Princeton University - Department of Political Science ( email )

Corwin Hall
Princeton, NJ 08544-1013
United States
609-258-0181 (Phone)

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