Estimating the Cost of Control Rights in the Corporate Loan Market

55 Pages Posted: 7 Sep 2022

See all articles by Andrew Bird

Andrew Bird

Chapman University - The George L. Argyros College of Business and Economics

Stephen A. Karolyi

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

Thomas Ruchti

Government of the United States of America - Office of Financial Research

Date Written: June 13, 2019

Abstract

Financial covenants transfer control rights to lenders when borrowers’ metrics breach pre-set thresholds. Contingent control rights allow lenders to extract monetary concessions (e.g., fees and renegotiation) and behavioral concessions (e.g., CEO turnover and reduced investment, R&D, and payroll). We develop a simple theoretical framework to estimate the cost of control, which we find to be 52.7 basis points. On average, control payments correspond to a 14.8% discount on the total cost of borrowing (Berg, Steffen, and Saunders 2016). This finding has implications for our understanding of loan pricing and the value of control rights in the private loan market.

Keywords: syndicated lending, financial covenants, control rights, loan pricing

JEL Classification: G21, G32, K12, L14, E32, E44

Suggested Citation

Bird, Andrew and Karolyi, Stephen A. and Ruchti, Thomas, Estimating the Cost of Control Rights in the Corporate Loan Market (June 13, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4197422 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4197422

Andrew Bird (Contact Author)

Chapman University - The George L. Argyros College of Business and Economics ( email )

1 University Drive
Orange, CA 92866
United States

Stephen A. Karolyi

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ( email )

400 7th Street SW
Washington, DC 20219
United States

Thomas Ruchti

Government of the United States of America - Office of Financial Research ( email )

717 14th Street, NW
Washington DC, DC 20005
United States

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