Growing Like Germany: Local Public Debt, Local Banks, Low Private Investment

67 Pages Posted: 23 Aug 2022 Last revised: 24 Aug 2022

See all articles by Mathias Hoffman

Mathias Hoffman

University of Zurich

Iryna Stewen

Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz - Gutenberg School of Economics and Management

Michael Stiefel

University of Zurich

Date Written: August 22, 2022

Abstract

Over 2010-2016, municipal debt in Germany crowded out private investment worth 1 percent of GDP. Forced to lend to municipalities by their statutes, local public banks compensated for declining municipal-debt yields by charging higher rates to firms in Germany’s locally segmented credit markets. The ensuing crowding-out was made worse by increased municipal borrowing when expensive fiscal commitments were shifted from federal and state to the municipal levels following the introduction of the debt brake. Our results identify new channels through which low interest rates adversely affect real outcomes and locally segmented credit markets can amplify contractionary effects from fiscal austerity.

Keywords: local public finance, firm-level investment, crowding-out, fiscal austerity, global and intra European imbalances

JEL Classification: E22, E40, E62, G21, G28, F21, F32, H32

Suggested Citation

Hoffman, Mathias and Stewen, Iryna and Stiefel, Michael, Growing Like Germany: Local Public Debt, Local Banks, Low Private Investment (August 22, 2022). Bank of Finland Research Discussion Paper No. 9/2022, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4197750 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4197750

Mathias Hoffman (Contact Author)

University of Zurich ( email )

Rämistrasse 71
Zürich, CH-8006
Switzerland

Iryna Stewen

Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz - Gutenberg School of Economics and Management ( email )

Mainz
Germany

Michael Stiefel

University of Zurich ( email )

Rämistrasse 71
Zürich, CH-8006
Switzerland

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