The Impact of Team Incentives on Performance in Graduate School: Evidence from Two Pilot Rcts

17 Pages Posted: 24 Aug 2022

See all articles by John A. List

John A. List

University of Chicago - Department of Economics

Rohen Shah

University of Chicago

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 22, 2022

Abstract

In organizations, teams are ubiquitous. 'Weakest Link' and 'Best Shot' are incentive schemes that tie a group member’s compensation to the output of their group’s least and most productive member, respectively. In this paper, we test the impact of these incentive schemes by conducting two pilot RCTs (one in-person, one online), which included more than 250 graduate students in a graduate math class. Students were placed in study groups of three or four students, and then groups were randomized to either control, Weakest Link, or Best Shot incentives. We find evidence that such incentive approaches can affect test scores, both in-person and online.

JEL Classification: C9, C93, D79, I2, J3

Suggested Citation

List, John A. and Shah, Rohen, The Impact of Team Incentives on Performance in Graduate School: Evidence from Two Pilot Rcts (August 22, 2022). University of Chicago, Becker Friedman Institute for Economics Working Paper No. 111, 2022, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4198352 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4198352

John A. List (Contact Author)

University of Chicago - Department of Economics ( email )

1126 East 59th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Rohen Shah

University of Chicago ( email )

1101 East 58th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

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