The Monetary Executive

60 Pages Posted: 9 Sep 2022 Last revised: 20 Mar 2023

See all articles by Christina Parajon Skinner

Christina Parajon Skinner

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: August 25, 2022


Contemporary presidents possess a significant array of powers to intervene in the economy unilaterally, via executive order or the Treasury Department’s tools. But the Constitution does not vest the Executive Branch with monetary or fiscal power. Rather, the President has accumulated vast monetary power gradually, over time, through successive delegations from Congress. This Article traces the development of a constitutional oxymoron—the “Monetary Executive”—through the lens of statutory delegations. Ultimately, the Article urges that the consequence of this migration of monetary power from Congress to the Executive will be corrosive to our democratic institutions and contribute to inflation—undermining the central bank’s independence, eroding fiscal discipline, and perpetuating policy error.

Keywords: constitutional law, separation-of-powers, non-delegation doctrine, monetary policy, Federal Reserve, presidential authority

JEL Classification: K23, K20, N20, P44, E65

Suggested Citation

Skinner, Christina Parajon, The Monetary Executive (August 25, 2022). George Washington Law Review, Vol. 91, 2023, Available at SSRN:

Christina Parajon Skinner (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School ( email )

3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels

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