Reforming the European Commission’s Enforcement of Cartel Law: The Case for Individual Administrative Sanctions

[2022] 2 Antitrust Chronicle 37

13 Pages Posted: 14 Sep 2022

Date Written: August 26, 2022

Abstract

Few would deny that the European Commission has an impressive track record with respect to anti-cartel enforcement. At present, however, a lacuna exists with respect to its enforcement powers: it cannot to impose fines on natural persons who are responsible for their companies’ cartel activity. This article argues that, in order to achieve the deterrence of cartel activity, the Commission should be invested with the power to impose individual administrative sanctions for violations of the EU-level cartel prohibition. Although such sanctions have a drawback in terms of their vulnerability to indemnification, the stigmatization policy currently pursued by the Commission with respect to cartel activity provides considerable scope to prevent the issue of indemnification from undermining the potential deterrent effect of individual administrative sanctions.

Keywords: Antitrust law, cartel law, European Commission, EU competition law, sanctions, administrative fines

JEL Classification: K21

Suggested Citation

Whelan, Peter, Reforming the European Commission’s Enforcement of Cartel Law: The Case for Individual Administrative Sanctions (August 26, 2022). [2022] 2 Antitrust Chronicle 37, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4201443

Peter Whelan (Contact Author)

University of Leeds ( email )

School of Law
University of Leeds
Leeds, West Yorkshire LS2 9JT
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.drpeterwhelan.com

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
363
Abstract Views
775
Rank
147,624
PlumX Metrics