NATO’s Enlargement and Russia’s Interests: Existential Threat or Invaluable External Discipline?
30 Pages Posted: 19 Oct 2022 Last revised: 26 Oct 2023
Date Written: October 25, 2023
Abstract
Many place the blame for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on NATO’s expansion following the collapse of the Soviet Union. NATO enlargement is said to have constituted an existential threat to Russia’s interests and thus a provocation for war. There is no questioning the deep unhappiness of Russia’s security establishment at the NATO expansion. There is also no questioning, as I point out in this note, that Russia’s economic development and security was never greater than in the 10-year window that followed NATO’s expansion in 1997. At the end of that golden decade, Russia had the option of two paths – global integration, subject to external constraints on behaviour, or pursuit of the “Русский мир” (“Russian World”), shrugging off the constraints imposed by treaties. Vladimir Putin chose the latter course. The result was disastrous both from an economic and a security perspective. Russia’s economy flat-lined after 2008 and shrank by a third in international purchasing power terms. At the same time, Russia’s eastern (Japan) and western (Europe) neighbours have flipped their policy posture from seeing Russia as opportunity to seeing it as threat and have expanded military budgets; NATO forces in Russia’s periphery, which were steeply reduced following the initial NATO accessions, have been sharply increased; the attack prompted two more non-NATO border countries to apply immediately for NATO membership; Ukraine has become a de facto NATO partner; and Russia’s own military has been heavily degraded. The critical point is that NATO expansion to include Ukraine would have prevented the war: Russia has not attacked NATO members, but has attacked those neighbours that were not in NATO (Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia). Importantly, the policy recommendation flowing from this analysis – to extend NATO protection to smaller countries balancing against larger and potentially hostile neighbours – is diametrically opposed to that flowing from the “NATO enlargement caused the war” theory. Russia lacks functioning internal restraints; external constraints on reckless behaviour by its policy elites are thus critical to preserve peace in the region.
Keywords: Russia, NATO enlargement, Georgia, Ukraine, realism
JEL Classification: F52, F53, F54, F60
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation