Appointing Arbitrators: Tenure, Public Confidence, and a Middle Road for ISDS Reform

GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 45 2022

GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 45, 2022

43 Mich. J. Int'l L. 171 (2022). Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol43/iss1/5, 2022

72 Pages Posted: 30 Aug 2022

See all articles by Thomas D. Grant

Thomas D. Grant

University of Cambridge - Lauterpacht Research Centre for International Law

F. Scott Kieff

George Washington University - Law School

Date Written: 2022

Abstract

When parties bring claims under investor-state dispute settlement ('ISDS') procedures, who should serve as decision-maker? Relevant par-ties ask the question in different settings and with different criteria in mind. A party in a dispute, contemplating ISDS proceedings, whether by it or against it, likely will focus on the qualities of particular individuals available to serve as arbitrators. Party-appointed panelists charged under the applicable instrument with choosing a neutral or chair, and institutional appointing authorities charged with that task or with choosing arbitrators in default of party choice, will also turn their minds to candidate assessment. Different individuals or institutions might look for somewhat different qualities, but all who are called upon to make the choice will think about how best to assess the candidates.

Suggested Citation

Grant, Thomas D. and Kieff, F. Scott, Appointing Arbitrators: Tenure, Public Confidence, and a Middle Road for ISDS Reform (2022). GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 45 2022, GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 45, 2022, 43 Mich. J. Int'l L. 171 (2022). Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol43/iss1/5, 2022, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4203834

Thomas D. Grant

University of Cambridge - Lauterpacht Research Centre for International Law

10 West Road
Cambridge, CB3 9DZ
United Kingdom

F. Scott Kieff (Contact Author)

George Washington University - Law School ( email )

2000 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20052
United States
202-994-4644 (Phone)

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