Accounting Comparability between M&A Bidders and Targets and Deal Outcome

55 Pages Posted: 7 Sep 2022 Last revised: 3 Dec 2024

See all articles by Seraina C. Anagnostopoulou

Seraina C. Anagnostopoulou

University of Piraeus, Department of Banking and Financial Management

Andrianos E. Tsekrekos

Athens University of Economics and Business - Department of Accounting and Finance

Date Written: December 03, 2024

Abstract

We examine whether acquirers make better acquisitions when target firms’ financial statements exhibit higher comparability with those of the acquirer. We hypothesize that higher comparability between M&A bidders/targets will result in lower deal integration and information processing costs, and easier detection of any financial misreporting practices. We examine long-run deal performance and find that financial reporting comparability between acquirers/targets is positively associated with long-run deal performance and makes post-acquisition divestitures less likely, consistent with comparability resulting in more successful acquisitions. We provide evidence on how comparative accounting information between M&A counterparties influences capital allocation decisions and value creation.

Keywords: Financial Statement Comparability, Mergers and Acquisitions, M&As, Synergies, Divestitures, Short-term and long-term M&A performance

JEL Classification: G14, G34, M41

Suggested Citation

Anagnostopoulou, Seraina C. and Tsekrekos, Andrianos E., Accounting Comparability between M&A Bidders and Targets and Deal Outcome (December 03, 2024). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4205590 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4205590

Seraina C. Anagnostopoulou (Contact Author)

University of Piraeus, Department of Banking and Financial Management ( email )

80 Karaoli & Dimitriou Str.
Piraeus, 18534
Greece

Andrianos E. Tsekrekos

Athens University of Economics and Business - Department of Accounting and Finance ( email )

76 Patission Street
GR-104 34 Athens
Greece

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