Why Do Loss Firms Pay Taxes?

48 Pages Posted: 23 Sep 2022

See all articles by Alexander Edwards

Alexander Edwards

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management

Adrian Kubata

University of Luxembourg

Terry J. Shevlin

University of California-Irvine; University of California-Irvine

Date Written: September 12, 2022

Abstract

In a broad sample of publicly traded firms over the period 1988−2017, we observe that the share of firms reporting pre-tax book losses increased from about 20 to 35%. Of those loss firms, on aver-age 68% have positive cash tax payments (taxpaying loss firms). The amount of taxes paid by these loss firms is substantial and increasing over time. This study seeks to understand this prevalence of taxpaying loss firms. We investigate the determinants of why loss firms pay taxes. We find that book-tax income reporting differences, firms’ multinational vs. domestic status, the occurrence of foreign profits/losses in total losses, different sources of income such as ordinary income vs. capital gains, as well as, special items, firms’ tax loss carry back potential and firm size are important determinants of why loss firms are paying taxes. These variables also are associated with the magnitude of the taxes paid.

Keywords: corporate taxes, losses, corporate tax function

JEL Classification: G39, H20, H25, H26

Suggested Citation

Edwards, Alexander S. and Kubata, Adrian and Shevlin, Terry J. and Shevlin, Terry J., Why Do Loss Firms Pay Taxes? (September 12, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4207204 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4207204

Alexander S. Edwards (Contact Author)

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management ( email )

105 St. George Street
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3E6 M5S1S4
Canada

Adrian Kubata

University of Luxembourg ( email )

Kirchberg, 6, rue Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi
Luxembourg
Luxembourg

Terry J. Shevlin

University of California-Irvine ( email )

Paul Merage School of Business
Irvine, CA California 92697-3125
United States
2065509891 (Phone)

University of California-Irvine ( email )

Paul Merage School of Business
Irvine, CA 92697-3125
United States
949-824-6149 (Phone)

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