Internal Governance Mechanisms and Corporate Misconduct

IESEG Working Paper Series 2022-ACF-05

46 Pages Posted: 26 Sep 2022

See all articles by Nicolas Eugster

Nicolas Eugster

University of Queensland - Business School

Oskar Kowalewski

IESEG School of Management; LEM - CNRS 9221

Piotr Spiewanowski

Polish Academy of Sciences (PAS) - Institute of Economics (INE PAN)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 6, 2022

Abstract

This study aims to provide new evidence linking internal corporate governance mechanisms and corporate misconduct, using a sample of 2,844 public US companies during the period 2007-2019. The results reveal that optimal size and diverse boards, including well-functioning audit committees, are negatively related to corporate violations. In contrast, we show that board members’ independence, activity, and ownership are positively related to a firm’s fraudulent activities. Therefore, not all internal governance mechanisms are related to lower corporate misconduct. Moreover, we show that some internal governance mechanisms, such as the share of female board members, mitigate only certain types of corporate misconduct.

Keywords: corporate misconduct, internal governance mechanisms, board of directors, committees ownership

JEL Classification: G01, G34, G38, K22, L51, M41

Suggested Citation

Eugster, Nicolas and Kowalewski, Oskar and Spiewanowski, Piotr, Internal Governance Mechanisms and Corporate Misconduct (September 6, 2022). IESEG Working Paper Series 2022-ACF-05, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4211747 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4211747

Nicolas Eugster

University of Queensland - Business School ( email )

Brisbane, Queensland 4072
Australia

Oskar Kowalewski (Contact Author)

IESEG School of Management ( email )

1 Parvis de La Défense
Socle de la Grande Arche
Paris La Défense cedex, 92044
France

HOME PAGE: http://www.ieseg.fr/en/faculty-and-research/professor/?id=1740

LEM - CNRS 9221 ( email )

Lille
France

HOME PAGE: http://lem.cnrs.fr/

Piotr Spiewanowski

Polish Academy of Sciences (PAS) - Institute of Economics (INE PAN) ( email )

Palace of Culture and Science
Pl. Defilad 1
Warsaw, 00-901
Poland

HOME PAGE: http://www.piotrspiewanowski.info

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