Facts and Fantasies About Wage Setting and Collective Bargaining

42 Pages Posted: 12 Sep 2022 Last revised: 14 Apr 2023

See all articles by Manudeep Bhuller

Manudeep Bhuller

University of Oslo - Department of Economics; Statistics Norway

Karl O. Moene

University of Oslo - Department of Economics

Magne Mogstad

University of Chicago

Ola Lotherington Vestad

Statistics Norway - Research Department; University of Chicago - Department of Economics

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Date Written: September 2022

Abstract

In this article, we document and discuss salient features of collective bargaining systems in the OECD countries, with the goal of debunking some misconceptions and myths and revitalizing the general interest in wage setting and collective bargaining. We hope that such an interest may help close the gap between how economists tend to model wage setting and how wages are actually set. Canonical models of competitive labor markets, monopsony, and search and matching all assume a decentralized wage setting where individual firms and workers determine wages. In most advanced economies, however, it is common that firms or employer associations bargain with unions over wages, producing collective bargaining systems. We show that the characteristics of these systems vary in important ways across advanced economies, with regards to both the scope and the structure of collective bargaining.

Suggested Citation

Bhuller, Manudeep and Moene, Karl O. and Mogstad, Magne and Vestad, Ola Lotherington and Vestad, Ola Lotherington, Facts and Fantasies About Wage Setting and Collective Bargaining (September 2022). NBER Working Paper No. w30437, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4216223

Manudeep Bhuller (Contact Author)

University of Oslo - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 1095 Blindern
N-0317 Oslo
Norway

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/manudeepbhuller

Statistics Norway ( email )

N-0033 Oslo
Norway

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/manudeepbhuller

Karl O. Moene

University of Oslo - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 1095 Blindern
N-0317 Oslo
Norway
+47 22855130 (Phone)
+47 22855035 (Fax)

Magne Mogstad

University of Chicago ( email )

1101 East 58th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Ola Lotherington Vestad

Statistics Norway - Research Department ( email )

Kongens Gt. 6
PO Box 8131 Dep
N-0033 Oslo
Norway

University of Chicago - Department of Economics ( email )

1126 E. 59th St
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

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