Democracy, Populism, and Concentrated Interests

Forthcoming 56 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW (2023)

iCourts Research Paper Series No. 307

50 Pages Posted: 22 Sep 2022 Last revised: 15 Nov 2022

See all articles by Shai Dothan

Shai Dothan

University of Copenhagen - iCourts - Centre of Excellence for International Courts

Date Written: September 21, 2022

Abstract

Concentrated interest groups have a significant advantage over diffuse interest groups: they can effectively stop free riding among their members. Because of this advantage, concentrated interest groups work in unison and manage to capture the government in many democracies. Democratic mechanisms of separation of powers, an independent judiciary, and the rule of law are designed to prevent the capture of government by concentrated interests. Under certain conditions, these mechanisms make it possible for diffuse interests to have a fair share of the influence over the government. Populist ideologists doubt that claim, however. They are convinced that democracies are captured by a small elite that controls most of the political power. The declared aim of populists is to give political power back to the majority of society. Despite that declared aim, this paper argues that the actions taken by populists have exactly the opposite outcome. By downgrading democratic mechanisms that constrain the government, populists end up making it easier for concentrated interests to capture the government and take advantage of diffuse groups.

Keywords: Populism, corruption, constitutional law

Suggested Citation

Dothan, Shai, Democracy, Populism, and Concentrated Interests (September 21, 2022). Forthcoming 56 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW (2023), iCourts Research Paper Series No. 307, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4225716

Shai Dothan (Contact Author)

University of Copenhagen - iCourts - Centre of Excellence for International Courts ( email )

Studiestraede 6
Copenhagen, DK-1455
Denmark

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