Do Real Estate Contingency Clauses Affect Selling Price and Time-on-The-Market?

36 Pages Posted: 22 Sep 2022

See all articles by Bruce L. Gordon

Bruce L. Gordon

University of North Alabama

Michael J. Seiler

College of William and Mary

Ralph Siebert

Purdue University; CESifo

Daniel T. Winkler

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Greensboro

Date Written: 2022

Abstract

Real estate contracts often contain a wide variety of contingency clauses. These third-party approvals are often outside the seller’s control and can lengthen the-time-on-the-market (TOM) and reduce the surety of close. To compensate for these undesirable attributes, buyers typically offer higher purchase prices. This study examines the factors affecting contract contingencies and the effect of contract contingencies on TOM and selling price. Using transactions from Miami-Dade County in south Florida, we find that the presence of contingency clauses is significantly related to market conditions, TOM, list price premiums, distressed transactions, brokerage characteristics, home occupancy status, size, and age. Contingency clauses have differential effects on price premia that range from -3.7% to +2.2%. However, when considering TOM, contingency clauses have significant price premia ranging from -3.3% to +2.4%.

Keywords: contingency clauses, price premia, real estate contracts, time-on-the-market, selling price

JEL Classification: R300, R310, L850

Suggested Citation

Gordon, Bruce L. and Seiler, Michael J. and Siebert, Ralph and Winkler, Daniel T., Do Real Estate Contingency Clauses Affect Selling Price and Time-on-The-Market? (2022). CESifo Working Paper No. 9947, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4226414 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4226414

Bruce L. Gordon (Contact Author)

University of North Alabama ( email )

United States

Michael J. Seiler

College of William and Mary ( email )

P.O. Box 8795
Williamsburg, VA 23185
United States

Ralph Siebert

Purdue University ( email )

610 Purdue Mall
West Lafayette, IN 47907
United States

CESifo ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Daniel T. Winkler

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Greensboro ( email )

P.O.Box 26170
Greensboro, NC 27412
United States

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