Rebel Governance and Development: The Persistent Effects of Guerrillas in El Salvador

112 Pages Posted: 26 Sep 2022 Last revised: 21 Apr 2025

See all articles by Antonella Bandiera

Antonella Bandiera

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) - Department of Political Science

Lelys Dinarte

World Bank

Juan Miguel Jimenez

University of Chicago

Sandra Rozo

World Bank

Maria Micaela Sviatschi

Princeton University

Date Written: September 2022

Abstract

How does rebel governance affect long-term development? Rebel forces have controlled territory and imposed their own institutions in many countries over the past decades affecting millions of people. We investigate the economic, social, and political consequences of temporary territorial control by guerrillas during the Salvadoran Civil War. During that time, guerrillas displaced state authorities and created informal institutions that encouraged autonomy and self-sufficiency. Using a spatial regression discontinuity design, we show that areas once under guerrilla control have experienced worse economic outcomes over the last 20 years than adjacent areas controlled by the state. In these areas, higher social capital coexists with negative economic consequences. The fact that rebel institutions developed as an alternative to the state generated mistrust of outsiders, and isolated these areas from the rest of the country, resulting in over-dependence on subsistence farming and disengagement from postwar governments. Results are larger in areas where rebel governance initiatives were stronger and do not revert despite increased postwar public investment in formerly guerrilla areas. This study shows that when non-state actors develop alternative governance institutions, these can prompt adverse development effects through lasting norms of distrust of out-groups.

Suggested Citation

Bandiera, Antonella and Dinarte, Lelys and Jimenez, Juan Miguel and Rozo, Sandra and Sviatschi, Maria Micaela, Rebel Governance and Development: The Persistent Effects of Guerrillas in El Salvador (September 2022). NBER Working Paper No. w30488, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4229111

Antonella Bandiera (Contact Author)

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) - Department of Political Science ( email )

Lelys Dinarte

World Bank ( email )

1818 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20433
United States

Juan Miguel Jimenez

University of Chicago ( email )

1101 East 58th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Sandra Rozo

World Bank ( email )

1818 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20433
United States

Maria Micaela Sviatschi

Princeton University ( email )

22 Chambers Street
Princeton, NJ 08544-0708
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
20
Abstract Views
323
PlumX Metrics