Modeling and Measuring Russian Corporate Governance: The Case of Russian Preferred and Common Shares (Russian Version)

43 Pages Posted: 13 Jul 2003  

Matthew I. Spiegel

Yale University - Yale School of Management, International Center for Finance

William N. Goetzmann

Yale School of Management - International Center for Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Andrey Ukhov

Cornell University

Abstract

This paper examines governance explanations for the discount of preferred shares to common shares in the Russian market. Conflicts between shareholder classes may help explain the discount. However, for this to be the sole explanation the estimated models suggest that the magnitude of future adverse shareholder events would have to be very high. Nevertheless, evidence of a common factor potentially related to governance seems evident in the data, implying that corporate control issues may at least be partially responsible for the observed preferred share discount.

JEL Classification: F3, G3

Suggested Citation

Spiegel, Matthew I. and Goetzmann, William N. and Ukhov, Andrey, Modeling and Measuring Russian Corporate Governance: The Case of Russian Preferred and Common Shares (Russian Version). Yale ICF Working Paper No. 03-25. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=423781

Matthew I. Spiegel

Yale University - Yale School of Management, International Center for Finance ( email )

135 Prospect Street
P.O. Box 208200
New Haven, CT 06520-8200
United States
203-432-6017 (Phone)
203-432-8931 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://som.yale.edu/~spiegel

William N. Goetzmann (Contact Author)

Yale School of Management - International Center for Finance ( email )

165 Whitney Ave.
P.O. Box 208200
New Haven, CT 06520-8200
United States
203-432-5950 (Phone)
203-436-9252 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://viking.som.yale.edu

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Andrey Ukhov

Cornell University ( email )

Ithaca, NY 14853
United States

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