43 Pages Posted: 13 Jul 2003
This paper examines governance explanations for the discount of preferred shares to common shares in the Russian market. Conflicts between shareholder classes may help explain the discount. However, for this to be the sole explanation the estimated models suggest that the magnitude of future adverse shareholder events would have to be very high. Nevertheless, evidence of a common factor potentially related to governance seems evident in the data, implying that corporate control issues may at least be partially responsible for the observed preferred share discount.
JEL Classification: F3, G3
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Spiegel, Matthew I. and Goetzmann, William N. and Ukhov, Andrey, Modeling and Measuring Russian Corporate Governance: The Case of Russian Preferred and Common Shares (Russian Version). Yale ICF Working Paper No. 03-25. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=423781