Anything Goes in Squid Game: Sequential Voting with Informed and Uninformed Voters

70 Pages Posted: 17 Oct 2022 Last revised: 13 Oct 2023

See all articles by Yuichiro Kamada

Yuichiro Kamada

University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business

Yosuke Yasuda

Osaka University - Graduate School of Economics

Date Written: October 11, 2023

Abstract

We consider a model of common-value sequential voting where voters are differentiated in their information. The intuition from the simultaneous-voting case---uninformed voters vote so as not to influence the outcome---suggests that the pivotal voter, unless being informed, would not like to end the voting. This would imply that voting takes a long time if voters are unlikely to be informed. However, we find that any voting outcome, including short voting, can arise in an equilibrium that uses consistent strategies, i.e., the informed voters follow their information. Despite such a variety of equilibria, all of them induce the same expected payoff to the voters. There also exist inconsistent-strategy equilibria that yield higher expected payoffs than under any consistent strategy profile. One of such equilibria yields the highest feasible expected payoff.

Keywords: sequential voting, common value, information aggregation, delegation

JEL Classification: C72, D72

Suggested Citation

Kamada, Yuichiro and Yasuda, Yosuke, Anything Goes in Squid Game: Sequential Voting with Informed and Uninformed Voters (October 11, 2023). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4238134 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4238134

Yuichiro Kamada (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business ( email )

545 Student Services Building, #1900
2220 Piedmont Avenue
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States

Yosuke Yasuda

Osaka University - Graduate School of Economics ( email )

1-7 Machikaneyama
Toyonaka, Osaka, 560-0043
Japan

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