Pre-Ipo Markets

Posted: 20 Jul 2003

See all articles by Francesca Cornelli

Francesca Cornelli

London Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Alexander Ljungqvist

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Swedish House of Finance; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

David Goldreich

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management

Date Written: March 1, 2003

Abstract

This paper develops a model of IPOs in which book building and a grey market (i.e. a when-issued market) take place simultaneously. While book building contains information about the fundamental value of the issue and is kept confidential, the grey market reflects the opinion of retail investors and is publicly observed. We show that when the grey market price is high relative to the fundamental value the underwriter will set the offer price close to the grey market price, but when the grey market price is low, he will set the offer price based on the fundamentals. This creates an asymmetry in the issue price and the aftermarket price relative to the grey market. We test the empirical implications of the model using data from grey market prices for European IPOs.

Suggested Citation

Cornelli, Francesca and Ljungqvist, Alexander and Ljungqvist, Alexander and Goldreich, David, Pre-Ipo Markets (March 1, 2003). EFA 2003 Annual Conference Paper No. 968, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=423862

Francesca Cornelli (Contact Author)

London Business School ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.lbs.ac.uk/faculty/fcornelli/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Alexander Ljungqvist

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Swedish House of Finance ( email )

Drottninggatan 98
111 60 Stockholm
Sweden

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

David Goldreich

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management ( email )

105 St. George Street
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3E6 M5S1S4
Canada
416-946-0833 (Phone)

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