Conflicts of Interest and Credible Information Provision by Specialized and One-Stop Banks

27 Pages Posted: 21 Jul 2003

See all articles by Xavier Freixas

Xavier Freixas

Universitat Pompeu Fabra; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE)

Patrick Bolton

Columbia Business School - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Joel Shapiro

Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences

Date Written: February 28, 2003

Abstract

This paper is concerned with the general question of the provision of information by financial intermediaries to their customers. Specifically, it analyses the different ways the market can be organized and its effects on pricing and the level of information investors obtain. We find that market structure depends on the reputation costs, switching costs for customers, and the existence of market power. This provides a new justification for the presence of one-stop banks. In addition, we find that information access such as the internet may promote integration.

Suggested Citation

Freixas, Xavier and Bolton, Patrick and Shapiro, Joel David, Conflicts of Interest and Credible Information Provision by Specialized and One-Stop Banks (February 28, 2003). EFA 2003 Annual Conference Paper No. 344. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=424008 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.424008

Xavier Freixas (Contact Author)

Universitat Pompeu Fabra ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain
+34 93 542 2726 (Phone)
+34 93 542 1746 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.upf.es/~freixas

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.upf.es/~freixas/more/personal1.htm

Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, Barcelona 08005
Spain

Patrick Bolton

Columbia Business School - Department of Economics ( email )

420 West 118th Street
New York, NY 10027
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/pbolton/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

Joel David Shapiro

Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain
+34 93 542 27 18 (Phone)
+34 93 542 17 46 (Fax)

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
144
Abstract Views
1,408
rank
198,727
PlumX Metrics