The Making of An Antitrust API: Proof of Concept

Stanford University CodeX Research Paper Series 2022 3 Stan. Computational Antitrust 22 (2023)

14 Pages Posted: 18 Oct 2022 Last revised: 28 Feb 2023

See all articles by Thibault Schrepel

Thibault Schrepel

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Stanford University's Codex Center; University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne; Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris (Sciences Po)

Date Written: October 12, 2022

Abstract

Computational antitrust promises not only to help antitrust agencies preside over increasingly complex and dynamic markets but also to provide companies with the tools to assess and enforce their compliance with antitrust laws. If research in the space has been primarily dedicated to supporting antitrust agencies, this article fills the gap by offering an innovative solution for companies. Specifically, this article serves as a proof of concept whose aim is to guide antitrust agencies in creating a decision-trees based antitrust compliance API intended for market players. It includes an open-access prototype of the API, which automates compliance with Article 102 TFEU by providing companies with access to the legality tests behind the most common practices. Finally, the article discusses the API limitations and lessons learned.

Keywords: antitrust, computational antitrust, antitrust api, antitrust compliance, computational law, competition law, monopolization, dominance, abuses of dominance

JEL Classification: K21, L12, L22, L20, L40, L41, L44, L50, D11, D20, D85, K24, L10, K24, K20, K39, K30, K23, K29, K00

Suggested Citation

Schrepel, Thibault, The Making of An Antitrust API: Proof of Concept (October 12, 2022). Stanford University CodeX Research Paper Series 2022 3 Stan. Computational Antitrust 22 (2023), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4241927

Thibault Schrepel (Contact Author)

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam ( email )

De Boelelaan 1105
1081 HV Amsterdam
Netherlands

Stanford University's Codex Center ( email )

559 Nathan Abbott Way
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
United States

University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne ( email )

France

Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris (Sciences Po) ( email )

27 rue Saint-Guillaume
Paris Cedex 07, 75337
France

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