A Disquieting Lack of Evidence for Disintermediation in a Home-Cleaning Platform

13 Pages Posted: 18 Oct 2022

See all articles by Ekaterina Astashkina

Ekaterina Astashkina

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business

Robert Bray

Northwestern University - Department of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences (MEDS)

Ruslan Momot

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business

Marat Salikhov

Yale School of Management

Date Written: October 10, 2022

Abstract

We study a sample of data from an online platform that matches home cleaners with people who want their homes cleaned. The dataset has a key feature: it reports with high frequency the geographic distances between the cleaners and their appointed residences during both the cleaners' working hours and off hours---viz., anytime the app is open on their phones. For example, we observe 57 and 46 distance snapshots a day for the mean and median cleaner, respectively. We use these distance measurements to test whether the cleaners disintermediate the work, returning to the residences to perform some undisclosed cleanings for which they will not have to pay the platform middleman its cut. We find no evidence of such disintermediation---in fact, we find strong evidence to the contrary. Specifically, we reject the null hypothesis that at least one in 10,000 (cleaner, residence, date) triples without an official cleaning had an unofficial cleaning.

Keywords: platform disintermediation, platform leakage, matching markets

JEL Classification: M50, M54, M13

Suggested Citation

Astashkina, Ekaterina and Bray, Robert and Momot, Ruslan and Salikhov, Marat, A Disquieting Lack of Evidence for Disintermediation in a Home-Cleaning Platform (October 10, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4244111 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4244111

Ekaterina Astashkina

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business ( email )

701 Tappan Street
Ann Arbor, MI MI 48109
United States

Robert Bray

Northwestern University - Department of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences (MEDS) ( email )

2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States

Ruslan Momot (Contact Author)

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business ( email )

701 Tappan Street
Ann Arbor, MI MI 48109
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.ruslanmomot.info

Marat Salikhov

Yale School of Management ( email )

165 Whitney Ave
New Haven, CT 06511

HOME PAGE: http://maratsalikhov.com

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
47
Abstract Views
160
PlumX Metrics