A Disquieting Lack of Evidence for Disintermediation in a Home-Cleaning Platform

19 Pages Posted: 18 Oct 2022 Last revised: 21 Nov 2023

See all articles by Ekaterina Astashkina

Ekaterina Astashkina

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business

Robert Bray

Kellogg School of Management

Ruslan Momot

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business

Marat Salikhov

New Economic School; SKOLKOVO Moscow School of Management

Date Written: October 10, 2022

Abstract

We study a sample of data from an online platform that matches home cleaners with people who want their homes cleaned. The dataset has a key feature: it reports with high frequency the geographic distances between the cleaners and their appointed residences during both the cleaners' working hours and off hours. For example, we observe 57 and 46 distance snapshots a day for the mean and median cleaner, respectively. We use these distance measurements to test whether the cleaners disintermediate the work, returning to the residences to perform some undisclosed cleanings for which they will not have to pay the platform middleman its cut. We find no evidence of such disintermediation---in fact, we find strong evidence to the contrary. Specifically, we will argue that no more than one in 83 relationships formed on the app will end in disintermediation.

Keywords: platform disintermediation, platform leakage, matching markets

JEL Classification: M50, M54, M13

Suggested Citation

Astashkina, Ekaterina and Bray, Robert and Momot, Ruslan and Salikhov, Marat, A Disquieting Lack of Evidence for Disintermediation in a Home-Cleaning Platform (October 10, 2022). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4244111 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4244111

Ekaterina Astashkina

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business ( email )

701 Tappan Street
Ann Arbor, MI MI 48109
United States

Robert Bray

Kellogg School of Management ( email )

2001 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States

Ruslan Momot (Contact Author)

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business ( email )

701 Tappan Street
Ann Arbor, MI MI 48109
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.ruslanmomot.info

Marat Salikhov

New Economic School ( email )

100A Novaya Street
Moscow, Skolkovo 143026
Russia

HOME PAGE: http://www.nes.ru

SKOLKOVO Moscow School of Management ( email )

1st km of Skolkovo highway
Odintsovsky District
Moscow 115035
Russia

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