Download This PaperSwimming in Pools: Collusion in the Salmon Market
Johns Hopkins Carey Business School Research Paper No. 23-05
“Swimming in Pools: Collusion in the Salmon Market” Danial Asmat, Margaret C. Levenstein, Valerie Y. Suslow, and Helen Wang, The Antitrust Bulletin 68:1 https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X221150368.
27 Pages Posted: 18 Oct 2022 Last revised: 24 Feb 2023
Date Written: October 10, 2022
Abstract
We study the events alleged in recent Norwegian salmon industry antitrust cases to explore the relationship between vertical integration and collusion. In particular, we are interested in whether vertical integration can facilitate the strategic use of coordination devices such as public price indices. The salmon market provides an intriguing opportunity to study these issues, as there was a vertical merger followed by a reformulation of the methodology by which prices for forward and spot contracts were reported for a new price index. We explore possible non-strategic motivations for the merger (e.g., labor cost efficiencies) and whether the confluence of the merger and the creation of the Nasdaq price index is associated with evidence consistent with collusion.
Keywords: antitrust, price-fixing, cartels, vertical Integration, price index, salmon industry
JEL Classification: L13, L41, L42, Q22
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Valerie Y. Suslow
Johns Hopkins University - Carey Business School ( email )
100 International Drive
Baltimore, MD 21202
United States
Zhihan (Helen) Wang
University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business ( email )
701 Tappan Street
Ann Arbor, MI MI 48109
United States