Swimming in Pools: Collusion in the Salmon Market

Johns Hopkins Carey Business School Research Paper No. 23-05

“Swimming in Pools: Collusion in the Salmon Market” Danial Asmat, Margaret C. Levenstein, Valerie Y. Suslow, and Helen Wang, The Antitrust Bulletin 68:1 https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X221150368.

27 Pages Posted: 18 Oct 2022 Last revised: 24 Feb 2023

See all articles by Danial Asmat

Danial Asmat

Spotify Economics

Margaret C. Levenstein

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Survey Research Center; The Stephen M. Ross School of Business at the University of Michigan, Business Economics and Public Policy

Valerie Y. Suslow

Johns Hopkins University - Carey Business School

Zhihan (Helen) Wang

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business

Date Written: October 10, 2022

Abstract

We study the events alleged in recent Norwegian salmon industry antitrust cases to explore the relationship between vertical integration and collusion. In particular, we are interested in whether vertical integration can facilitate the strategic use of coordination devices such as public price indices. The salmon market provides an intriguing opportunity to study these issues, as there was a vertical merger followed by a reformulation of the methodology by which prices for forward and spot contracts were reported for a new price index. We explore possible non-strategic motivations for the merger (e.g., labor cost efficiencies) and whether the confluence of the merger and the creation of the Nasdaq price index is associated with evidence consistent with collusion.

Keywords: antitrust, price-fixing, cartels, vertical Integration, price index, salmon industry

JEL Classification: L13, L41, L42, Q22

Suggested Citation

Asmat, Danial and Levenstein, Margaret C. and Suslow, Valerie Y. and Wang, Zhihan (Helen), Swimming in Pools: Collusion in the Salmon Market (October 10, 2022). Johns Hopkins Carey Business School Research Paper No. 23-05, “Swimming in Pools: Collusion in the Salmon Market” Danial Asmat, Margaret C. Levenstein, Valerie Y. Suslow, and Helen Wang, The Antitrust Bulletin 68:1 https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X221150368. , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4244205 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4244205

Danial Asmat

Spotify Economics ( email )

150 Greenwich St
New York, NY 10007
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/danialasmat/

Margaret C. Levenstein (Contact Author)

University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Survey Research Center ( email )

500 S. State Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
United States
734-615-9088 (Phone)
734-647-1186 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www-personal.umich.edu/~maggiel

The Stephen M. Ross School of Business at the University of Michigan, Business Economics and Public Policy

Ann Arbor, MI 48109
United States
734-764-8336 (Phone)

Valerie Y. Suslow

Johns Hopkins University - Carey Business School ( email )

100 International Drive
Baltimore, MD 21202
United States

Zhihan (Helen) Wang

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business ( email )

701 Tappan Street
Ann Arbor, MI MI 48109
United States

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