Evolution and the Ultimatum Game

67 Pages Posted: 13 Oct 2022

See all articles by Aslıhan Akdeniz

Aslıhan Akdeniz

European University Institute

Matthijs van Veelen

University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam School of Economics (ASE); Tinbergen Institute

Abstract

In this paper we review, upgrade, and synthesize existing models from evolutionary game theory, all of which aim at explaining human behaviour in the ultimatum game. Our new and improved versions of Gale et al. (1995), Nowak et al. (2000), and Rand et al. (2013) avoid shortcomings that the original versions have, one of which is that the results in the first and the last are driven by bias in the mutations. We also compare the predictions of these three models with the existing experimental evidence by looking at properties of the distributions of minimal acceptable offers. We find that the observed distributions do not conform to the predictions from Gale et al. (1995), Rand et al. (2013), or any other model in which there is no fitness benefit to rejecting. This does not rule out commitment-based explanations, such as Nowak et al. (2000).

Keywords: Ultimatum game, Fairness, mutation-selection equilibrium, Quantal Response Equilibrium, commitment, experimental evidence

Suggested Citation

Akdeniz, Aslıhan and van Veelen, Matthijs, Evolution and the Ultimatum Game. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4246892 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4246892

Aslıhan Akdeniz

European University Institute ( email )

Villa Schifanoia
133 via Bocaccio
Firenze (Florence), 50014
Italy

Matthijs Van Veelen (Contact Author)

University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam School of Economics (ASE) ( email )

Roetersstraat 11
Amsterdam, North Holland 1018 WB
Netherlands

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Gustav Mahlerplein 117
Amsterdam, 1082 MS
Netherlands

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