Externalities of Policy-Induced Scrappage: The Case of Automotive Regulations

70 Pages Posted: 17 Oct 2022 Last revised: 18 Dec 2024

See all articles by Connor Forsythe

Connor Forsythe

Carnegie Mellon University

Akshaya Jha

Carnegie Mellon University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Jeremy J. Michalek

Carnegie Mellon University

Kate Whitefoot

Carnegie Mellon University

Date Written: October 2022

Abstract

Many transportation policies indirectly affect vehicle travel and resulting externalities by inducing changes in vehicle scrappage rates. We leverage the staggered removal of state-level safety inspection programs across the United States within an instrumental variables (IV) framework to produce the first estimates of the fleet-size elasticities of fleet travel distance and gasoline consumption. Our first-stage estimates indicate that the removal of safety inspections caused a 3-4% increase in fleet size on average. Our IV estimates of the fleet-size elasticities of fleet travel distance and gasoline consumption have 95% confidence sets that imply rejection of an assumption commonly used in prior analyses that these elasticities are equal to one. Calculations based on fleet-size elasticities of one result in substantial overestimates of the externality costs from increases in travel and fuel use from delays in scrappage due to the removal of safety inspections.

Suggested Citation

Forsythe, Connor and Jha, Akshaya and Michalek, Jeremy J. and Whitefoot, Kate, Externalities of Policy-Induced Scrappage: The Case of Automotive Regulations (October 2022). NBER Working Paper No. w30546, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4249577

Connor Forsythe (Contact Author)

Carnegie Mellon University ( email )

Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
United States

Akshaya Jha

Carnegie Mellon University ( email )

Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Jeremy J. Michalek

Carnegie Mellon University ( email )

Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
United States

Kate Whitefoot

Carnegie Mellon University ( email )

Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
20
Abstract Views
421
PlumX Metrics