References (18)


Citations (5)



The Line Item Veto and Public Sector Budgets: Evidence from the States

Douglas Holtz-Eakin

Syracuse University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

March 1988

NBER Working Paper No. w2531

Recent proposals assume that endowing the U.S. President with a line item veto will reduce spending. Analysis of a rich set of state budget data indicates that long run budgets are not altered by an item veto. In the short run, the item veto's potency is contingent upon the political setting. Governors with political incentives to use an item veto alter spending and revenues in a statistically significant and quantitatively important fashion. These results suggest that adoption of the line item veto, in general, is unlikely to reduce the size of the federal government.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 45

Open PDF in Browser Download This Paper

Date posted: July 16, 2004  

Suggested Citation

Holtz-Eakin, Douglas, The Line Item Veto and Public Sector Budgets: Evidence from the States (March 1988). NBER Working Paper No. w2531. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=425563

Contact Information

Douglas Holtz-Eakin (Contact Author)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Syracuse University ( email )
900 S. Crouse Avenue
Syracuse, NY 13244-2130
United States
315-443-3612 (Phone)
315-443-3717 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN

Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 842
Downloads: 29
References:  18
Citations:  5