Enriching a Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics Inside Firms

41 Pages Posted: 22 Jul 2003 Last revised: 23 Jul 2003

See all articles by Robert S. Gibbons

Robert S. Gibbons

Massachusetts Institute of Technology - Sloan School and Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Michael Waldman

Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 2003

Abstract

In previous work we showed that a model that integrates job assignment, human-capital acquisition, and learning can explain several empirical findings concerning wage and promotion dynamics inside firms. In this paper we extend that model in two ways. First, we incorporate schooling into the model and derive a number of testable implications that we then compare with the available empirical evidence. Second, and more important, we show that introducing task-specific' human capital allows us to produce cohort effects (i.e., the finding that a cohort that enters a firm at a low wage will continue to earn below-average wages years later). We argue that task-specific human capital is a realistic concept and may have many important implications. We also discuss limitations of our (extended) approach.

Suggested Citation

Gibbons, Robert S. and Waldman, Michael, Enriching a Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics Inside Firms (July 2003). NBER Working Paper No. w9849. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=425585

Robert S. Gibbons (Contact Author)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology - Sloan School and Department of Economics ( email )

E52-432
MIT
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-253-0283 (Phone)
617-258-6855 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Michael Waldman

Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management ( email )

Ithaca, NY 14853
United States
607-255-8631 (Phone)

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